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Using a detailed sample made up of more than 20,000 investment rounds, we analyze
the time to ‘IPO’, ‘trade sale’ and ‘liquidation’ for about 6,000 venture backed ﬁrms. We
model these exit times using competing risks models. Biotech and internet ﬁrms have the
fastest IPO exits. Internet ﬁrms are also the fastest to liquidate, while biotech ﬁrms are
however the slowest. The conditional probability for IPOs are clearly non-monotonous
with respect to time. As time ﬂows, venture capital-backed ﬁrms ﬁrst exhibit an increased
likelihood of exiting to an IPO. However, after having reached a plateau, investments that
have not yet exited have fewer and fewer possibilities of IPO exits as time increases. The
bubble period from 1998 to 2000 was an ‘easy money’ period where venture capitalists
gavemuchmoremoneytoﬁrms, manyofwhichdidnotofferoutstandinggrowthpotential
as they tended to liquidate much faster than in normal times.
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+31 (0) 20 5257179, Email: a.schwienbacher@uva.nl.The assessment of possible exit options is of paramount importance for venture capitalists
prior to their investments in new ventures. Indeed, not only are they concerned about how
they can cash out but also how long they need to stick with their portfolio companies before
cashing out. The exit decision therefore has two main dimensions. First, the type of exit route
(the most important being the IPO, trade sale and liquidation) and secondly the actual timing
of the exit.1 The existing academic literature on venture capital exits has shown that venture
capitalists time their exits using stage ﬁnancing split into several rounds (e.g., Gompers, 1995
and Bergemann and Hege, 1998): in each round, the entrepreneur gets the necessary ﬁnancing
to proceed to the next intermediate development phase, but the venture capitalists refrain from
given more money than actually needed. Besides the disciplinary action that this procedure
exerts on venture capital-backed ﬁrms, this stage ﬁnancing also gives exit options to venture
capitalists at every ﬁnancing round. Because exit options for start-up companies are highly
cyclical, venture capitalists aim at optimally timing their divestments. For instance, the in-
ternet bubble period was characterized by easy exits. Since venture-backed companies got a
lot of public interest, going public was easy as investors stood ready to buy the newly issued
equity of venture-backed companies when the IPO took place. Market conditions changed
dramatically in 2001 and 2002 as the NASDAQ and most stock indices crashed. Next to the
well documented stock market losses of individual and professional investors, the investors’
appetite for newly issued shares waned considerably and the number of ﬁrms going public
slowed to a trickle. Therefore venture capitalists had very few chances to divest their in-
vestments in recently funded start-up companies. This highlights the dependence of venture
capital investments on prevailing exit conditions.
Much of the past research on venture capital exits has dealt with IPOs. Indeed, an IPO is
deemed to be the most successful (hence preferred) venture capital exit. For example, Lerner
(1994) examined the ability of venture capitalists to time IPOs in the biotechnology industry
by going public when equity values are high, and using private ﬁnancings when share prices
are lower. Gompers (1996) shows that the building of a reputation affects the timing of going
public. Less-experienced venture capitalists may not wait until the market is optimal to take
ﬁrms public, because they need to signal their quality to potential investors in follow-on funds.
Both papers only focus on the time dimension of exit and for IPOs only. A few recent papers
have looked at the full range of exit routes, e.g. Cumming (2002) and Schwienbacher (2002).
1These two papers only look at the type of exit but do not examine the timing of the exit nor the
interaction between the timing and type of exits (the two dimensions highlighted above). Sev-
eral other papers play up the crucial role of active stock markets and the importance of IPOs as
exit routes for venture capitalists. Black and Gilson (1998) argue that active stock markets al-
low venture capitalists to exit more easily while leaving the entrepreneur in control of the ﬁrm.
Michelacci and Suarez (2002) provide a further rationale for the link between stock markets
and venture capital markets. They claim that the public markets allow venture capitalists to
‘recycle’ the ﬁnancing invested in their successful investments so that new funds are available
for new start-ups. Other papers show a positive link between company valuation and the like-
lihood of going public (Cochrane, 2001, Cumming and MacIntosh, 2000, Gompers, 1995, and
Darby and Zucker, 2002). Das, Jagannathan, and Sarin (2002) provide an extensive analysis
of exits by venture capitalists and Ritter and Welch (2002) one on IPO activities in the US.
On a related topic, Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) show that venture capitalists include control
rights and covenants in their contracts to keep their options open regarding exit possibilities.
While IPO exits have been researched quite extensively, a stock market listing is however
only one out of several ways to exit private equity investments. Interestingly, the academic
literature has not focused much on other types of exits such as trade sales and liquidations.
Nor do we know how these various exit routes interact with each other over time. Moreover,
little is known about the effect of the recent internet bubble on the relative importance (espe-
cially trade sales compared to IPOs) of competing exit possibilities. In this paper, we consider
both dimensions (i.e. type and timing) of exit within a single framework of analysis. Thus, we
explore the full range of exit routes, i.e. not only IPOs, but also trades sales and liquidations.
This is particularly important when tackling the issue of ‘exit risk’ for venture capital invest-
ments as it requires jointly taking into account all potential exit routes. We also look at how
exit conditions evolve when ﬁrms move up the ladder of ﬁnancing rounds and compare these
results with the prevailing conditions at the initial (ﬁrst round) investment. Last, we further
examine how the internet bubble affected the exit conditions of venture-backed companies.
Morespeciﬁcally, usingadetailedsamplemadeupofmorethan20,000investmentrounds,
we analyze the time to exit through IPO, trade sale and liquidation for about 6,000 venture-
backed ﬁrms. Set in the framework of survival analysis, we characterize and model the times
to exit using competing risks models. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst application of such
2statistical models to venture capital investments.2 The strength of this approach lies in the
rigorous statistical modelling of exit times, and the possibility to fully parameterize the exit
times with known covariates (i.e. explicative variables known at the time the investment round
took place). As such, each type of exit exhibits its own dynamics and has its own dependence
with respect to variables such as the industry type of the ﬁrm, the size of the syndicate, and
the amount of venture capital received. Quite importantly, the use of the generalized Gamma
density distribution as the underlying statistical distribution in the competing risks models al-
lows for non-monotonous increasing/decreasing conditional probabilities of exits (also called
hazard functions). For example, this allows for increased (as time goes by) conditional prob-
abilities of exits to IPO during the ﬁrst n years, and thereafter a decreasing conditional prob-
ability of exit. Because the dynamics of the times to exit depend on the selected explicative
variables that pertain to the status of the ﬁrm or the characteristics of the investment round,
we can highlight the pattern shown by ﬁrms that belong to a speciﬁed industry (e.g. internet
ﬁrms vs biotech ﬁrms) or that got funded during the internet bubble time period.
The statistical analysis delivers key results which can be summarized as follows. First,
biotech and internet ﬁrms have the fastest IPO exits. Internet ﬁrms are also the fastest to
liquidate, whilebiotechﬁrmsarehowevertheslowest. Secondlyandregardingtheshapeofthe
conditional probability (hazard) of IPO exit, one has ﬁrst a sharply increasing hazard and then
a slowly decreasing hazard. Thus, as time ﬂows, venture capital-backed ﬁrms ﬁrst exhibit an
increasedlikelihoodofexitingtoanIPO.However, afterhavingreachedaplateau, investments
that have not yet exited have fewer and fewer possibilities of IPO exits as time increases. Note
that this pattern is stronger for biotech and internet ﬁrms which tend to reach their plateau
sooner than computer or semiconductor ﬁrms. This suggests that venture capitalists should
not stick with ongoing investments that have an increased likelihood of being non-performing
investments. Thirdly, the bubble period was an ‘easy money’ period where venture capitalists
gave much more money to ﬁrms, many of which did not offer outstanding growth potential
as they tended to liquidate much faster than in normal times. Moreover, the bubble period
sped up the exit of investments already in the pipeline, i.e. investments who had been initiated
some time ago and for which venture capitalists were eager to have a now accelerated exit.
Fourthly, the bubble affected some industries more than others: the internet, computer and
communication/media industries were strongly affected as ﬁrms in those industries exhibited
3signiﬁcantly smaller exit times during the bubble. Finally and as expected, later (expansion)
stage investments exit to IPO more quickly than expansion (early) stage investments.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. After this introduction, we detail the data
and variables in Section I. Section II gives a review of exit decisions and types of exits for
venture capital-backed ﬁrms. It also provides a review of the empirical literature that deals
with venture capital exits. We next present the competing risks model in Section III. The
empirical application is split into 2 sections: Section IV gives a detailed descriptive analysis,
while we present all the estimation results in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes.
I. Data
The data used in this paper has been extracted from the VentureXpert database. Our database
is made up of successive records, each record pertaining to 1 investment round in a given
venture-backed ﬁrm. Note that whenever the ﬁrm was involved in more than one ﬁnancing
round, we therefore have as many observations (per ﬁrm) as investment rounds, see below
for an example. The data was pre-ﬁltered to remove all records where the times-to-exit (DU-
RATION variable thereafter) are smaller than 14 days or larger than 20 years and we also
removed all records for which the amount of money received (AMOUNT variable) by the
ﬁrm is smaller than $10,000 or larger than $100,000,000. These observations are deemed to
be meaningless outliers for which the recorded values do not belong to a plausible range. This
pre-ﬁltering leads us to discard very few records and gives us a sample made up of 22,042
investment rounds for 5,817 distinct venture-backed companies.3
To characterize the ﬁrms in our dataset and the stage ﬁnancing they got from venture
capitalists, we use the following variables:
- On the industry type (dummy variable): INTERNET (internet industry), BIOTECH (biotech
industry), COMPUTER (computer industry), SEMIC (semiconductor industry), MEDI-
CAL (medical industry), COMMEDIA (communication and media industry) and OTH-
ERIND (other industries than those listed above). These variables are equal to 1 (0) if
the given ﬁrm belongs (does not belong) to the speciﬁed industry.
4- On the stage of development (dummy variable): EARLY (early stage ﬁnancing), EXPAN-
SION (expansion stage), LATER (later stage), BUYACQ (buy/acquisition stage), OTH-
ERSTAGES (other stages than those listed above). Set to 1 (0) if the ﬁnancing stage
matches (does not match) the description of the variable.
- On the type of exit (dummy variable): IPO (IPO exit), TRADESALE (trade sale exit),
LIQUID (liquidation exit). Set to 1 (0) if the ﬁrm exited (did not exit) according to
the exit speciﬁed by the variable. Note that many ﬁrms are characterized by IPO =
0, TRADESALE = 0 and LIQUID = 0 as they are still ‘active’, i.e. venture capitalist
have not yet exited, or have exited via a fourth exit route. These latter routes could
include secondary sales or management buyouts (MBO).4 This will yield right-censored
durations in the statistical analysis (see below for the DURATION variable and Section
III).5
- ROUND: ordinal round number of the investment. This indicates which ﬁnancing round we
are dealing with.
- SYNDSIZE: syndicate size, i.e. number of venture capital ﬁrms that participated in that
ﬁnancing round.
- AMOUNT: total amount of money received by the ﬁrm at the given round (in millions of
USD).
- BUBBLE: dummy variable equal to 1 if the investment was made during the bubble time
period from ranges from September 1, 1998 to April 30, 2000 (inclusive), and 0 other-
wise.
- DURATION:numberofdayselapsedbetweenthedateatwhichtheroundbeganandtheexit
date if there was an exit. If the ﬁrm has not yet exited, this variable gives the number of
days elapsed between the date at which the round began and the date of the analysis(June
23rd, 2003).6 This variable is the main focus of our analysis as it characterizes the ‘life’
of the investment since a given round.
All in all we thus have a total of 14 explicative variables, although many of these variable
are pure dummy variables.7 The full statistical model is detailed in Section III. As an illus-
tration, Table I presents the data structure and deﬁnition of variables for two venture-backed
ﬁrms that made an IPO exit (Ask Jeeves and Brocade) and a third ﬁrm (InGenuity) that had
5not yet exited at the date of the analysis (June 23rd, 2003). Although this will be detailed in
Sections IV and V, we can already see that Ask Jeeves, an internet ﬁrm, is characterized by a
fast IPO exit (DURATION = 303 days since round 1, which was an early stage round).
II. Exit decisions and type of exits for venture capital-backed
ﬁrms
In this section, we present and motivate some research hypotheses that provide guidelines
for the empirical analysis of Sections IV and V. These guidelines are motivated by recent
developments in the empirical and theoretical literature on venture capital exit and ﬁnancing.
First, it has been argued that, in contrast to an IPO, a trade sale is a more universal exit
channel, i.e. a type of exit available to many ﬁrms and not only to the most successful start-
ups. Venture capitalists do a trade sale for highly successful as well as less successful portfolio
companies. Sometimes, venture capitalists even choose a trade sale for unproﬁtable ventures
but for which a larger corporation is keen on acquiring the technology. This latter ﬁrm is thus
ready to pay more than the liquidation value of the venture. This contrasts with the common
wisdom that exit via an IPO is limited to high ﬂyers only. Several papers have therefore
concluded that an IPO tend to be the most preferred exit route for venture capitalists (Lerner,
1994, Bascha and Walz, 2001, Cumming and MacIntosh, 2001, Darby and Zucker, 2002, and
Schwienbacher, 2002a). This leads us to expect a greater heterogeneity in the type of ventures
doing a trade sale, which should also impact investment duration.
Hypothesis 1 (‘High Flyers’): Times-to-exit for trade sales should exhibit a greater het-
erogeneity than times-to-exit for ﬁrms going public via an IPO.
Furthermore, most venture capital deals are syndicated and the size of the syndicate tends
to become larger as the venture gets more developed. Many rationales have been suggested
to explain the co-investment of such deals (Admati and Pﬂeiderer, 1994, Barry, Muscarella,
Perry, and Vetsuypens, 1990, Megginson and Weiss, 1991, Brander et al., 2002, Lerner, 1994
and Hellmann, 2001). These studies suggest that larger syndicates should make exit easier
for successful start-ups as far as it increases the pool of contacts required to make a trade sale
6possible. It may also improve the reputation of venture capitalists who succeed in bringing
a ﬁrm public via an IPO. Moreover, one can expect increased performance through greater
complementarities of skills between participating syndicate members.
Hypothesis 2 (Syndication): Larger syndicate sizes should increase the likelihood of
exiting from a successful venture, either through a trade sale or an IPO.
Exit conditions are highly cyclical and largely depend on the current or foreseen state of
stock markets as well as other macro-economic factors (Lerner, 1994, Gompers and Lerner,
1999, Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2001, and Cumming, Fleming, and Schwienbacher, 2003). In
bubble periods as witnessed at the end of 1990s, the ﬁnancial markets were very attractive and
investors were keen on buying newly issued stock. Correspondingly, the exit from successful
ﬁrms should have been easy. On the other hand, since the exit from unsuccessful companies
is largely determined by bankruptcy rules, the latter type of companies should not have be
affected. We also conjecture that some industries should have been more affected than others
during the bubble periods. Indeed the height of the stock market craze saw many internet ﬁrms
goingpublic. Manyoftheseﬁrmshadaratherdubiousbusinessandwerehighlyunproﬁtable.8
Hypothesis 3 (Bubble Period): Exiting from successful ventures (trade sale and IPO)
is expected to be more likely and quicker in bubble periods. There should be no effect on
unsuccessful ventures. Sharp differences across industry types are to be expected.
Several papers have evidenced the use and optimality for venture capitalists of staging
the ﬁnancing in many rounds (Gompers, 1995, Bergemann and Hege, 1998, and Cornelli and
Yosha, 2002). As such, entrepreneurs have strong incentives to be focused on their ﬁrm and
they know that they have to deliver intermediate results to investors before getting additional
funds. In other words, it also provides investors with the option to stop the project when
predetermined benchmarks are not met (Bergemann and Hege, 2002). Practitioners typically
distinguish between several stages of development, e.g. early stage, expansion stage and later
stage.9 Obviously, an early-stage project should be less developed than an project in the
expansion stage and especially later stage. This is summarized in the next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4 (Development stages and successful projects): The time-to-exit for suc-
cessful projects decreases with the development of the project. In particular, it is greatest for
early stage and shortest for later stage projects.
7In the same vein, least developed projects are also the most risky ones. Survival should
therefore be greatest for ventures with more developed projects. This is summarized in the
next hypothesis where the development of a project is proxied by its development stage: early
stage projects are typically riskier investments than projects in the expansion stage or later
stage.
Hypothesis 5 (Development stages and unsuccessful projects): The likelihood of failure
(exit through a liquidation) decreases with the development of the project.
A decision variable in any investment is the amount of funds supplied. More funds should
increase investment durations for two reasons. First, a larger amount of committed money
increases the likelihood of success as far as it provides management with better resources.
And second, it allows entrepreneurs to pursue unsuccessful projects for a longer time period
when obtaining more funds upfront.
Hypothesis 6A (Increased resources): A larger amount of committed money allows the
entrepreneur to pursue inefﬁcient projects for a longer time period, which increases investment
duration for unsuccessful projects.
Hypothesis 6B (Rush to exit): More funds allow the entrepreneur to develop the project
quicker. This decreases investment durations for successful and unsuccessful projects.
All these hypotheses will guide our empirical investigations in the next sections. Note that
to control for project-speciﬁc characteristics, we also include in all estimated models industry
dummies for the most important industry sectors.
III. Survival analysis and competing risks models
As brieﬂy discussed in the introduction, our statistical analysis relies on survival analysis and
competing risks models. Competing risks models are powerful statistical models tailored to
model durations (also called time to failure) that end with multiple exits (also called multiple
type of failure). They originate from the engineering sciences and have been extensively used
in the medical sciences and in empirical studies of labor markets. In the ﬁrst case, the duration
(or time-to-exit in the venture capital terminology used above) is typically the number of days
8elapsed between the patient taking the given medicine and the possible failure (full recovery
or death by several distinct causes of the patient for example). In the second case, the duration
could be the length of time until an unemployed individual gets a job or quits searching.
Recently competing risks models have also been used in the modelling of high-frequency
stock market transaction data, where the duration is the time between a given price change
and the exits are an increase or decrease in the stock price (Bauwens and Giot, 2003). In this
section, we ﬁrst detail a simple two-state competing risks model and then show how we plan
to use a multi-state competing risks model in the venture capital exits framework. Additional
information on survival analysis and/or competing risks models can be found in Crowder
(2001), Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice (2002) and Lee and Wang (2003).
A. A simple competing risks model
The next sub-section presents the competing risks model used in the empirical analysis of
Section V. We however ﬁrst present a simple competing risks model with 2 exits to illustrate
the general methodology. Let us consider a set of investments characterized by their durations
(i.e. times until exit) and their exit types. In this introductory example, we assume that there
are two exit possibilities (success and failure) and that the durations are not right censored.10
We thus have a set of pairs (xi;yi), where xi is the duration of the investment and yi is a
variable indicating the exit type. In this simpliﬁed example, there are only two possible exits
characterized by mutually exclusive end states: yi = 1 (success) or yi = ¡1 (failure). For
simplicity, let us assume that the hazard function is constant, which is equivalent to assume
an exponential distribution for xi.11 The idea of the competing risks model is to let the hazard
vary with the end state, in this case to have two hazards since yi is binary. Thus we deﬁne ls
(respectively lf) as the hazard of duration xi when the end state is yi = 1 (respectively -1). In
most competing risks model, the hazards are made dependent on a set of covariates, which can
thus be viewed as explicative variables which speed up/slow down the exits. For example, the
exponential form ls = ebs;0+bs;1X1+:::+bs;kXk (and correspondingly lf = ebf;0+bf;1X1+:::+bf;kXk),
where X1,...,Xk are the covariates, is widely used to ensure the positivity of the hazards. As
in classical survival analysis, coefﬁcients bs;1,...,bs;k;bf;1,...,bf;k then allow an immediate
assessment of the inﬂuence of the explicative variables on the exits. At the end of duration
xi, either state yi = 1 (success) or state yi = ¡1 (failure) is realized. In the framework of a
9competing risks model, the duration corresponding to the state that is not realized is truncated,
since the observed duration is the minimum of two possible durations: the one which would
realize if yi = 1, and the one which would realize if yi = ¡1.12 This implies that the realized
state will contribute to the likelihood function via its density function, while the truncated state
contributes to the likelihood function via its survivor function.13
B. A competing risks model for venture capital exits
The competing risks model detailed in the previous sub-section can readily be used to model
the exit times and types of exit (the two dimensions of our analysis discussed in the introduc-
tion) of venture capital-backed investments provided that:
- we allow for multiple exits (IPO, trade sale and liquidation in this study);
- we allow for right-censoring, as many investments have not yet exited at the time of the
analysis (i.e. they are still categorized as ‘active’ investments by the venture capitalist);
- we allow for competing hazards that depend on a set of covariates (type of industry for the
ﬁrm, amount of capital given to the ﬁrm, size of syndicate,...) that are known at the
time of the investment;
- we estimate the competing risks models for a given round. This stems from the fact that a
duration is deﬁned herein as the time elapsed between the actual round date when the
ﬁrm got the money from the venture capitalist and the time of the analysis (June 23rd,
2003);
- we allow for possible non-monotonously increasing or decreasing hazards, i.e. use den-
sity distributions such as the generalized Gamma density distribution for example. The
choice of the ‘right’ density distribution can be tricky. Monotonously increasing or
decreasing hazard functions are the simplest to use but imply that, as time ﬂows, the
likelihood of exiting gets either larger and larger or smaller and smaller. In our context,
we could have a likelihood of instantaneous IPO exit that ﬁrst gets larger and larger as
the ﬁrm gets the funding, but then decreases once the ﬁrm does not deliver good results.
After many trials and with the beneﬁt of hindsight, we settle for the generalized Gamma
10distribution, which is one of the most ﬂexible density distributions available for survival
analysis studies.
In the empirical analysis of Section V, we use the generalized Gamma density distribution
















if k = 0, where g = jkj¡2, z = sign(k)(ln(t)¡µ)=s, u = ge(jkjz). The dependence with respect
to the covariates is introduced through µj = Xjb, where j is the observations’ index. In the
venture capital framework of this study (IPO, trade sale and liquidation exits) and with the 14
explicative variables detailed in Section I, this translates into 3 speciﬁcations for µj as we have
3 mutually exclusive exit possibilities:14
µj;IPO = b1;IPOINTERNETj+b2;IPOBIOTECHj+:::+b14;IPOBUYACQ; (3)
µj;TS = b1;TSINTERNETj+b2;TSBIOTECHj+:::+b14;TSBUYACQ (4)
and
µj;LIQ = b1;LIQINTERNETj+b2;LIQBIOTECHj+:::+b14;LIQBUYACQ: (5)
In these speciﬁcations, the k and s parameters determine the general shape of the hazard
function (monotonously increasing or decreasing, or more generally non-monotonous, as time
increases) while the b parameters determine the ‘time acceleration’. The j index refers to the
available observations per round. A signiﬁcantly negative value for any b parameter implies
that an increase in the corresponding variable leads to a signiﬁcantly faster exit. For example,
a signiﬁcantly negative b8;IPO (the coefﬁcient of the SYNDSIZE variable in the speciﬁcation
11of the IPO exit) would mean that, as the size of the syndicate grows, the time-to-exit for an
IPO gets shorter. Note that, for dummy variables, exponentiated coefﬁcients (i.e. eb1;IPO for
example) have an easy interpretation as ‘time ratios’. Moreover, these exponentiated time
ratios can be directly set against each other, which gives relative time ratios. For example, the
relative time ratio (for the IPO exit) of the internet industry with respect to the biotech industry
is equal to eb1;IPO=eb2;IPO.
IV. Descriptive analysis
In this section, we provide a descriptive analysis of our dataset. Estimation results for the
competing risks model are given in the next section. While Table II provides the frequency
of exit routes for different types of investment stages, Table III gives a breakdown of key
statistics by investment rounds, industries and stages of development. Finally, Table IV gives
information on the industry type and stages of development during the bubble period and
outside that time frame.
Table II shows that the proportion of exit types is quite similar across ﬁnancing stages,
except from the fact that there is a slight increase in trade sales with the increasing stage of
development (and the decreasing likelihood of IPOs). In both panels, the ratio of trade sales
over IPOs therefore tends to increase. Furthermore, this ratio is always greater than 1. For
instance, there are about 50% more trade sales than IPOs for early-stage investments.
AbreakdownofAMOUNTandSYNDSIZEbyroundnumber(PanelAofTableIII, shown
foruptoround5)showsthattheAMOUNTvariableincreasessteadilywhengoingfromround
1 to round 4. From round 3 onwards, it however stabilizes around $ 9 million. The fact that
ﬁrms receive a much lower amount of money in their ﬁrst round of ﬁnancing is consistent
with the literature: venture capitalists do not want to commit too many funds at the start
of the venture capital process. Note although that there is a great standard deviation in all
rounds. The SYNDSIZE variable also seems to be lower for the ﬁrst rounds. For all types of
exits, the duration decreases as the number of rounds increases, which is to be expected and
is in line with Hypothesis 5 that conjectures a reduction in duration as the project gets more
developed. For example (IPO exit), the mean duration goes from 1,620 days to 925 days as
12the representative ﬁrm goes from round 1 to round 5 (for trade sales, it goes down from 2,059
days to 1,506 days; for liquidations, it decreases to 981 days from 1,554 days). Again, there
is a variability in the means for all the exit routes.
The breakdown of ﬁrms across industries (Panel B of Table III) shows that internet and
computer companies attract the substantial part of the venture capital invested, while biotech
companiesaremuchlessrepresented(inabsolutenumber). Similarly, abreakdownofAMOUNT
and SYNDSIZE by type of industry (Panel B of Table III) shows that the average internet
ﬁrm got much more money (around $12.9 million) that the other types of ﬁrms. Communica-
tion/media ﬁrms rank second (mean of $9.5 million), while the other ﬁrms received on average
around $6-9 millions. The mean of SYNDSIZE does not really change across industry types.
Focusing on IPO exits only, it becomes obvious that internet ﬁrms had the fastest exit, with a
mean of 670 days. Firms in the other industries needed much more time, the slowest being the
semiconductor ﬁrms (mean duration of 1,725 days). When focusing on liquidations, it is also
true that internet ﬁrms had the fastest exits (the representative internet ﬁrm exhibits a mean
duration to liquidation of around 721 days).
Looking at the pattern of AMOUNT and SYNDSIZE for the different ﬁnancing stages
(Panel C of Table III), we see that buyouts/acquisitions provide the largest mean amount
(around $14 million) and involve on average 3 venture capital ﬁrms. In contrast, early stage
investments are characterized by an average amount of $5.1 million and an average of 3.5
venture capital ﬁrms. For IPO exits, a breakdown of DURATION per ﬁnancing stage yields
a mean of 1,581 days (early stage), and decreases as we go to the expansion and later stages.
This supports Hypothesis 5 again. Furthermore, we observe similar patterns for trade sale and
liquidation.
The BUBBLE variable characterizes investments that took place during the so-called bub-
ble time period for the NASDAQ. Table IV provides summary statistics for investments during
the internet bubble (BUBBLE = 1) as well as in ‘normal times’ (BUBBLE = 0). During the
bubble period, internet type investments made up 39.2% of all investments, the computer in-
dustry being number 2 with 23.1%. Note that biotech investments made up only 4.1% of
all investments during the bubble time period (against 7.2% in ‘normal times’). There are
however no sharp differences between the stages of ﬁnancing (early/expansion/later stages)
regarding the bubble and normal time periods. Early and expansion (later) stage investments
13are somewhat less (more) frequent during bubble times. In contrast, there is a sharp difference
in the amount of money given to ﬁrms when in normal or bubble times. Indeed the mean
amount increases from $6.6 million to $13.4 million!15 Finally, the mean duration to exit
(irrespective of the type) is only equal to 344 days in bubble times, while it is equal to 1,328
days in normal times. In this case the difference is also highly signiﬁcant.
V. Estimation results
The descriptive analysis given in the previous section provided relevant information on the
dataset and on the exit characteristics. In this section we estimate the competing risks model
detailed above to fully describe and analyze the exit process. We characterize extensively the
estimation results for rounds 1 and 2, but then lump together the comments for rounds larger
than 2 as these estimations do not bring a lot of additional interesting results.
For all types of exits, we estimate the model with all explanatory variables (see Section I)
included as covariates and we use the generalized Gamma density function as the distribution
for the underlying error term.16 We also allow for heterogeneity in the speciﬁed model.17 Al-
lowing for heterogeneity leads to somewhat less efﬁcient estimators when dealing with small
datasets. We however have a very large dataset and the minor loss of efﬁciency is irrelevant
here. Note that we conclude similarly (from a qualitative point of view) with and without the
frailty estimation option. When dealing with venture capital data, there is a strong case for
suspecting that there is heterogeneity in the data. Indeed the quantitative information provided
in the database is only part of the picture as the important ‘qualitative’ information (e.g. qual-
ity of the product developed by the ﬁrm, its degree of innovation, the current technological
trends,...) about the venture-backed ﬁrm is not included. We present the estimation results
for the ﬁrst and second rounds in Table VI and for the third and fourth rounds in Table VII.
Note that we analyze the residuals of the models after each estimation. As suggested by the
literature on survival analysis (Engle and Russell, 1998, Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice, 2002), we
focus on the so-called generalized Cox-Snell residuals (Cox and Snell, 1968): if the model ﬁts
the data well, then these residuals should be exponentially distributed. This can be checked
by plotting their cumulative hazard function, along with the benchmark line with slope equal
to 1. Anticipating on the estimation results given below, we can already claim that the ﬁt of
14the models is quite good. As examples, we provide such plots in Figures 5 and 6 (IPO, trade
sale and liquidation exits, rounds 1 and 2). Note that the quite ‘erratic’ line segments at the
top right corner of some of the graphs refer to a couple of extreme residuals (outliers), while
the hundreds of residuals cluster around the straight line with slope equal to 1.
A. Round 1 (5,817 observations)
A.1. Exit to IPO
All coefﬁcients (except for the BUYACQ and SYNDSIZE variables) are signiﬁcant at the 5%
level and have the expected sign. In particular, later stage investments exit more quickly than
expansion stage investments. This is also the case for expansion and later stage investments
with respect to early stage investments, which supports the prediction of Hypothesis 4. This
is conﬁrmed by Wald statistical tests, according to which the null hypotheses coef(EARLY)
> coef(EXPANSION) and coef(EXPANSION) > coef(LATER) are not rejected individually.
From a statistical point of view, larger syndicate sizes somewhat increase the hazard for IPOs,
and thus decrease exit times, as the SYNDSIZE coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at the 6% level. This
coefﬁcient is however very small (-0.026) and therefore an increase in the syndicate size does
not really impact the timing of the exit in a meaningful way. For example, an increase of the
syndicate size from 4 to 8 implies a relative time ratio of only e¡0:026¢8=e¡0:026¢4 = 0:9. In line
with Hypothesis 6B on faster project realization, larger committed amounts also decrease exit
times (signiﬁcantly negative AMOUNT coefﬁcient). The time ratio (or relative exponentiated
coefﬁcients) representation allows an easy comparison across industry classiﬁcations. Biotech
ﬁrms have the fastest exits and are followed by internet ﬁrms. With respect to these ﬁrms,
computer ﬁrms exhibit a relative time ratio of almost 1.5 (computed as e8:886=e8:476) while
the other industries are in-between (not taking into account the ‘other industries’ category).
Wald statistical tests indicate that the null hypothesis coef(INTERNET) = coef(BIOTECH)
cannot be rejected, while the coefﬁcients of the other industries are individually signiﬁcantly
different from the coefﬁcients of the INTERNET and BIOTECH industries (for example the
null hypothesis coef(INTERNET) = coef(COMPUTER) is rejected).
15Quite importantly, the model rejects the null hypothesis of monotonously increasing or de-
creasing hazard. Hence, the generalized Gamma cannot be simpliﬁed into the Weibull density
distribution for example. This is shown in Figure 1, where we plot the estimated hazard func-
tion for the ﬁrst 4 industry classiﬁcations for a typical venture capital-backed ﬁrm that would
receive (at the early stage and outside the bubble time frame) a $10 million funding provided
by a syndicate of 4 venture capitalists, i.e. the covariates are ﬁxed such as SYNDSIZE = 4,
AMOUNT = 10, BUBBLE = 0 and EARLY = 1.18 Regarding the shape of the hazard func-
tions, one has ﬁrst a sharply increasing hazard (to about 1,000 - 1,500 days) and then a slowly
decreasing hazard. Thus, as time ﬂows, venture capital-backed ﬁrms ﬁrst exhibit an increased
likelihood of exiting to an IPO. However, after having reached a plateau (around 1,000 - 1,500
days of existence, i.e. 2.75 - 4.0 years), investments that have not yet exited have fewer and
fewer possibilities of exits as time increases. This suggests that venture capitalists should not
hesitate to ‘pull the plug’ after a given number of years, rather than stick with potentially non-
performing ﬁrms.19 This pattern is stronger for biotech and internet ﬁrms which tend to reach
their plateau sooner than computer or semiconductor ﬁrms (around 5 years (1,800 days) for
these latter ﬁrms, around 3.3 years (1,200 days) for the former). In the top panel of Figure 4 we
plot the hazard functions for an internet ﬁrm and the three ﬁnancing stages, with SYNDSIZE
= 4, AMOUNT = 10, BUBBLE = 0. As expected by Hypothesis 4 on stages of development,
the maximum of the hazard functions shifts left as we go from early to expansion and ﬁnally
later stage ﬁnancing. We then repeat the exercise for a biotech and computer ﬁrm, and the re-
sults are given in the middle and bottom panels of Figure 4. Quite surprisingly, the BUBBLE
coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly positive, which leads to a time ratio greater than 1: investments
made during the bubble period did not lead to faster IPO exits (more on this below, as this
coefﬁcient gets signiﬁcantly negative for rounds larger than 2). We therefore ﬁnd no support
for Hypothesis 3 on quicker exits for ﬁrst round investments during the bubble period.
A.2. Exit to trade sale
Estimation results are somewhat similar to those presented above for the exit to IPO, although
there are some differences. The coefﬁcients for the AMOUNT and BUBBLE variables are no
longer signiﬁcant while the coefﬁcient for the SYNDSIZE variable is now highly signiﬁcant.
The latter is in line with the idea that a larger syndicate increases the pool of corporate contacts
16required to ﬁnd a buyer and thus do a trade sale. The relative time ratios between the different
industries are not as dispersed and belong to a tighter range. The classiﬁcation is also different
as the internet, computer and communication/media ﬁrms have the fastest exit to a trade sale.
The plots of hazard functions in the middle panel of Figure 1 tell the same story (same covari-
ates as for the ﬁrst ﬁgure of preceding sub-section). Note that in this case all hazard functions
reach their maximum much later (around 2,500 - 4,000 days, i.e. 6.8 - 11 years) and decrease
much more slowly thereafter. A comparison of hazard functions for exits to IPO and trade
sale suggests that venture capital-backed ﬁrms ﬁrst aim for an IPO exit and then consider (or
are forced to consider) trade sale exits as their second choice. It also provides support for the
notion pointed out in Hypothesis 1 that candidates for a trade sale are less homogeneous than
those for an IPO.
A.3. Exit to liquidation
There are some marked differences with respect to the successful exits (IPO and trade sale)
documented above. First the coefﬁcients for the EARLY, EXPANSION, LATER and BUY-
ACQ variables are quite close to each other and it is no longer true that coef(LATER) <
coef(EXPANSION) < coef(EARLY): the timing of the stage does not seem to hint at a
faster/slower liquidation of the ﬁrm, contradicting Hypothesis 5. In this case, the BUBBLE
coefﬁcient is strongly negative (with a time ratio of e¡0:704 = 0:49), which suggests that ﬁrms
that received venture capital money during bubble times have a much larger probability of
quick liquidation. In Section IV we showed that the amount of money raised (per funded ﬁrm)
during bubble times was much larger than during normal times. This clearly shows that the
bubble period was an ‘easy money’ period where venture capitalists gave much more money
to ﬁrms, many of which did not offer outstanding growth potential as they tended to liquidate
much faster than in normal times. The relative time ratio of internet ﬁrms with respect to the
other ﬁrms is also striking as it is between 1/3 and 1/4! This is clearly shown in the bottom
panel of Figure 1 (same covariates as before) as there is a clear gap between the hazard func-
tions of internet related ﬁrms and the other types of ﬁrms. Note also that the hazard function
for internet ﬁrms reaches its plateau quite quickly (around 1,200 days) and strongly decreases
thereafter. In contrast, biotech ﬁrms are the slowest to liquidate (largest relative time ratio,
slowly increasing hazard function and delayed plateau). Lerner (1994) notes that “biotechnol-
17ogy ﬁrms [...] mature slowly and do not incur large up-front costs in building manufacturing
facilities”, which could explain why (in conjunction with the often lengthy Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) approval process) these ﬁrms do not tend to liquidate quickly. In contrast,
internet ﬁrms have been known to be gobbling up cash, which justiﬁes their quick demise if
they did not succeed in meeting their ﬁnancial goals within a limited time frame.
These estimation results also concur with the descriptive analysis given in Table V. In
this table, we present the number and type of exit for ﬁrst round investments made during and
outside the bubble period. A look at the left (bubble period) and right (outside the bubble
period) parts of that table reveals that liquidations occurred much more frequently during
the bubble period. While all industry sectors exhibit approximately the same pattern, results
for the internet sector are particularly impressive as both periods (i.e. inside and outside the
bubble period) are characterized by a large number of funded ﬁrms (164 vs 220). For some
of the other industry sectors (biotech and medical for example), results are more difﬁcult to
interpret as few ﬁrms got ﬁrst round ﬁnancing during the internet bubble.
B. Round 2 (4,691 observations)
Because of the many similarities with the results of the ﬁrst round, we highlight more partic-
ularly the results speciﬁc to round 2. Regarding the IPO exit, the results are similar to those
presented for the ﬁrst round, although many coefﬁcients are no longer signiﬁcant (they still
have the expected sign though). Biotech and internet ﬁrms still have the lowest relative time
ratios, but the internet ﬁrms are much closer to the other ﬁrms than in round 1. Biotech ﬁrms
still exhibit an impressive halved time ratio with respect to most of the other ﬁrms. This is also
shown in Figure 2, where we plot the estimated hazard function for the ﬁrst 4 industry clas-
siﬁcations with SYNDSIZE = 4, AMOUNT = 10, BUBBLE = 0 and EARLY = 1. Note that
the hazard functions reach their maxima much earlier than for round 1 (around 700 days for
biotech ﬁrms, around 900 - 1,200 days for the other ﬁrms). This is of course consistent with
thefactthat we nowdeal with the secondﬁnancing round, which should thus be muchcloser to
the IPO than the ﬁrst round. Again the general shape is decisively ﬁrst sharply increasing and
then slowly decreasing as time goes by. This type of pattern is particulary striking for biotech
ﬁrms. For exits to trade sales, results are very close to those given above for the ﬁrst round:
18the relative time ratios are much less dispersed and the hazard functions reach their maxima
much later than for an IPO exit (around 2,000 days). Finally, for liquidation exits, results are
also similar to those for the ﬁrst round. In this case, the BUBBLE coefﬁcient is again sharply
negative, with a time ratio of 0.47 (i.e. e¡0:755). As for the ﬁrst round, internet (biotech) ﬁrms
have the lowest (largest) time ratio. See also the hazard functions plotted in the bottom panel
of Figure 2. Note however that coef(LATER) < coef(EXPANSION) < coef(EARLY), but the
coefﬁcients are not signiﬁcant.
C. Round 3 and above
Focusing on the results speciﬁc to these rounds we see that, for all rounds and all exits, the
BUBBLE coefﬁcient is now negative. The hazard functions (plotted in Figure 3) reach their
maxima within a couple of months, and then sharply decrease. Round 3 biotech investments
are particularly impressive.
D. All rounds: summary of main results
The descriptive and estimation results given above can be summarized as follows. Later stage
investments exit to IPO more quickly than expansion stage investments. This is also the case
for expansion and later stage investments with respect to early stage investments. The industry
type matters in a big way as biotech and internet ﬁrms have the fastest IPO exits. Internet
ﬁrms are the fastest to liquidate, while biotech ﬁrms are the slowest. Regarding trade sale
exits, internet, computer and communication/media ﬁrms have the fastest exits. The model
generally rejects the null hypothesis of monotonously increasing or decreasing hazards for
all speciﬁcations. Regarding the shape of the hazard functions (exit to IPO), one has ﬁrst a
sharply increasing hazard and then a slowly decreasing hazard. Thus, as time ﬂows, venture
capital-backed ﬁrms ﬁrst exhibit an increased likelihood of exiting to an IPO. However, after
having reached a plateau (around 1,000 - 1,500 days of existence), investments that have not
yet exited have fewer and fewer possibilities of IPO exits as time increases. Note that this
pattern is stronger for biotech and internet ﬁrms which tend to reach their plateau sooner than
computer or semiconductor ﬁrms (around 1,800 days for these latter ﬁrms, around 1,200 days
19for the former). This motivates and supports the ‘limited partnership’ structure of VC ﬁrms
where VC investment funds automatically dissolve after a given number of years (rather than
sticking with ongoing investments). The bubble period was an ‘easy money’ period as venture
capital-backed ﬁrms were awash with funds but many of these ﬁrms tended to liquidate much
faster than in normal times. Furthermore the bubble period led to signiﬁcantly decreased exit
times for investments made at round 3 or above. This suggests that the bubble period sped up
the exit of investments already in the pipeline, i.e. investments who had been initiated some
time ago and for which venture capitalists were eager to have a now accelerated exit. Broadly
speaking, we conclude similarly for all rounds. Of course, as the round number increases,
hazard functions tend to shift leftwards, as one get closer and closer to the exit (particulary
true for the IPO exit).
E. The internet bubble and the industry type
The estimation results given above suggest that exits were sped up during the internet bubble.
Indeed the evidence is conclusive for the IPO and trade sale exits (starting at round 3) and
strongly conclusive for the liquidation exit (all rounds). It can however be argued that the in-
ternet bubble has affected some ﬁrms more than others. We conjecture that the bubble has sped
up the exits for speciﬁc industries, while it has hardly affected others.20 This hypothesis can
be tested with our dataset and within the framework of the competing risks model. To do this,
we remove the INTERNET dummy variable from the model and include 7 additional indus-
try type dummy variables. These new industry type variables (INTERNET B, BIOTECH B,
COMPUTER B, SEMIC B, MEDICAL B, COMMEDIA B and OTHERIND B) are dummy
variables that are equal to 1 when the ﬁrm is in the given industry AND the given ﬁnancing
round took place during the bubble. We then estimate the competing risks model with the
13+7 variables hence deﬁned. Estimation results are given in Table VIII. Note that we only
report results for the 7 new internet bubble related variables as the estimated coefﬁcients of
the 13 previous variables do not really change. A bird’s eye view of that table ascertains that 3
of the 7 industries were strongly affected by the bubble: the internet, computer and communi-
cation/media industries. For these industries, the bubble sped up the liquidations (all rounds)
and the IPOs (round 3 and above). On the contrary, the bubble did not really impact the other
industries as the corresponding dummy coefﬁcients in Table VIII are not signiﬁcant. These
20results strongly support the hypothesis that the bubble did not have an evenly impact on all
venture capital ﬁnancings.
VI. Conclusion and outlook
For venture capitalists, the decision to exit has two main dimensions, the type and the timing
of the exit. This paper has examined both dimensions of exit simultaneously in the framework
of competing risks models and survival analysis. Besides the rigorous statistical modelling of
exits times, this approach allows the computation of the instantaneous probabilities (hazards)
of the different exit routes, conditional on the time already elapsed and on covariates (type of
industry, stage of development, syndicate size,...) included in the model.
We put forward a series of interesting results. First, the type of industry matters as the
biotech and internet ﬁrms have the fastest IPO exits. Regarding the least favorable exit (the
liquidation of the ﬁrm), internet ﬁrms are also the fastest to liquidate, while biotech ﬁrms are
however the slowest. Second, the instantaneous conditional probabilities (or hazards) for IPO
exits are clearly non-monotonous. As time ﬂows, venture capital-backed ﬁrms ﬁrst exhibit an
increased likelihood of exiting to an IPO. However, these upward sloping hazards then reach
a plateau and start to decrease: investments that have not yet exited have fewer and fewer
possibilities of IPO exits as time increases. Third, the bubble period from 1998 to 2000 was
an ‘easy money’ period where venture capitalists gave much more money to ﬁrms, many of
which did not offer outstanding growth potential as they tended to liquidate much faster than
in normal times. It also sped up the exit of investments initiated earlier as venture capital-
ists wanted to capitalize on better exit chances. As conjectured, the bubble affected some
industries more than others. More precisely, the internet, computer and communication/media
industries were strongly affected as ﬁrms in those industries exhibited signiﬁcantly decreased
exit times during the bubble. More generally, our results thus shed light on the competing exit
possibilities for venture capitalists and on the dynamics of the time-to-exit for the IPO, trade
sale and liquidation exits.
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Frequency of exit route for different types of investment stage.
Stage of investment Nbr. obs. Exit route Ratio TS-IPO
IPO Trade sale Liquidation Other routes
Panel A: ﬁrst investment round (ROUND = 1)
Early stage 1,839 33.8% 53.0% 9.8% 3.4% 1.57
Expansion stage 472 38.4% 50.4% 8.7% 2.5% 1.31
Later stage 141 34.8% 55.3% 5.0% 5.0% 1.59
Buyout/Acquisition 218 28.4% 56.0% 8.3% 7.3% 1.97
Other stages 54 31.5% 64.8% 1.9% 1.9% 2.06
Panel B: all investment rounds
Early stage 3,957 35.1% 52.4% 8.4% 4.0% 1.49
Expansion stage 4,397 33.6% 52.8% 9.1% 4.5% 1.57
Later stage 2,692 30.0% 56.2% 8.3% 5.5% 1.87
Buyout/Acquisition 407 26.3% 57.7% 10.1% 5.9% 2.20
Other stages 249 30.1% 62.7% 5.2% 2.0% 2.08
Panel A gives the exit routes frequencies by stage of investment for the ﬁrst investment round (by
focusing on the ﬁrst round only, we make sure that each exited company is represented once). Panel
B provides similar summary statistics for all investment rounds of exited companies. Column 2
gives the number of observations per stage of investment for which an exit already occurred. The
last column gives the ratio of trade sales over IPOs. Since we exclude yet-to-exit investments, the
total number of observations is 2,724 for Panel A and 11,702 for Panel B.
26Table III
Summary statistics for the investment rounds, industries and stages of development.
Variable Nbr. Obs. AMOUNT SYNDSIZE DURATION (in days)
IPO TS IPO and TS Liquidation













































































































































































































































Key statistics for different investment rounds, industries and stages of development. AMOUNT is expressed in
$1,000,000s and gives the amount of money received by the ﬁrm. SYNDSIZE is the size of the syndicate. Standard
deviations are reported below each value in brackets.
27Table IV
Summary statistics for investment during and outside the bubble period.
Variables Full sample Period of observation Test of diff.
BUBBLE = 1 BUBBLE = 0 P-value
Industry sector:
- INTERNET 15.9% 39.2% 11.3%
- BIOTECH 6.7% 4.1% 7.2%
- COMPUTER 8.1% 5.0% 8.8%
- MEDICAL 28.8% 23.1% 30.0%
- SEMIC 12.1% 8.4% 12.9%
-COMMEDIA 14.4% 13.1% 14.6%
- OTHERIND 14.0% 7.2% 15.4%
Stages of development:
- Early stage 33.7% 33.30% 35.68%
- Expansion stage 40.1% 38.91% 45.79%
- Later stage 19.4% 20.29% 14.80%
- Buyout/Acquisition 4.3% 4.55% 2.72%
- Other stages 2.6% 2.95% 1.02%
Mean amount (in $1,000,000s) 7.7 13.4 6.6 0.00
Mean syndicate size 3.9 3.96 3.88 0.15
Mean duration to IPO (in days) 1,219 344 1,328 0.00
The variable BUBBLE equals 1 (0) if the investment took place during (outside) the internet bubble
period that ranges from September 1998 to April 2000. The number of observations for BUBBLE =
1 (BUBBLE = 0) is 3,643 (18,399), which makes a total of 22,042.
28Table V































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1. Hazard functions for the IPO, trade sale and liquidation exits as a function of
industry type; durations start at round 1. Besides the industry type, the covariates are















































































































































Figure 2. Hazard functions for the IPO, trade sale and liquidation exits as a function of
industry type; durations start at round 2. Besides the industry type, the covariates are












































































































































Figure 3. Hazard functions for the IPO, trade sale and liquidation exits as a function of
industry type; durations start at round 3. Besides the industry type, the covariates are































































































































Figure 4. Hazard functions (IPO exit) for the internet (top), biotech (middle) and computer
(bottom) industries as a function of the type of stage; durations start at round 1. Besides the
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Figure 5. Cumulative hazard functions of Cox-Snell residuals for the IPO, trade sale and
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Figure 6. Cumulative hazard functions of Cox-Snell residuals for the IPO, trade sale and
liquidation exits; durations start at round 2. We also plot the benchmark line whose slope is
equal to 1.
38Notes
1Note that we also use the word ‘trade sales’ for so-called acquisitions.
2Note that Gompers (1995) also uses duration models, but these are not competing risks
models.
3Note that we get the same qualitative results and conclude similarly when using non-
ﬁltered data.
4Because of the structure of the competing risks model used in the statistical analysis, the
fact that we do not model explicitly these other types of exit routes does not lead to any bias
in our estimations for the IPO, trade sale and liquidation exits.
5Note that if a company had more than one ﬁnancing round, we consider the exit type at
the very end of the ﬁnancing cycle (i.e. the exit route chosen at the end of the last round). In
other words, for a given ﬁrm, this variable takes the same value for all ﬁnancing rounds. See
the examples given below.
6This is characterized as a right-censored duration in the terminology of survival analysis.
See Section III.
7Note that to avoid multicolinearity problems in the statistical analysis of Section V, we
do not include a constant and we have to drop one of the dummy variables (as the industry
type and stage of development type variables sum to 1 separately): we do not include the
OTHESTAGES dummy variable.
8See Cassidy (2002) for a lively account of the internet bubble.
9For a more detailed categorization of investment stages, see e.g. the EVCA or NVCA
websites.
10In competing risks models, durations are said to be right-censored if the corresponding
individual or ﬁrm at risk has not yet exited at the time of the analysis. Right-censoring is
discussed below.
3911In survival analysis, the hazard function gives at all times the conditional instantaneous
probability of exit given that the subject at risk has not yet exited at that time. For example,
in a medical science context, the hazard of death by heart attack at time t for a patient is the
instantaneous probability of dying of a heart attack at time t given that the patient is still alive
‘just’ before time t.
12As indicated in Lee and Wang (2003): “This is perhaps the most important concept in
competing risks analysis. It is because the basic assumption for a competing risks model is
that the occurrence of one type of event removes the person from risk of all other types of
events and the person will no longer contribute to the successive risk set.
13Assuming independence (conditionally on the past state) between the durations ending
at states yi = 1 and yi = ¡1, the joint ‘density’ of duration xi and state yi in our simpliﬁed












1 if yi = 1





For example, if state yi = 1 is observed (I+
i = 1 and I¡
i = 0), xi contributes to the likeli-
hood function via the density function lse¡lsxi and via the survivor function e¡lfxi. Details
regarding the construction of likelihood functions of competing risks models are available in
Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice (2002).
14Note that in practice more than 3 exit types are observed. This is also the case in our
sample. We focus however on the IPO, trade sale and liquidation exits as these are the most
important exists and are the real focus of our analysis. Because of the multiplicative nature of
the likelihood function for competing risks models (see Equation (1)), not modelling explicitly
the other (few) types of exits does not lead to any bias.
4015Statistical tests clearly reject the null hypothesis that the two means are equal.
16As indicated previously, we avoid multicolinearity problems by not including the constant
and the OTHERSTAGES dummy variable.
17We do this by estimating the model with the ‘frailty’ option provided in Stata. Details are
available in Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice (2002) and in the “Survival analysis and epidemiological
tables” Stata reference guide.
18To ensure a good readability of the graphs, we do not plot all 7 types of industries on the
same graph. Full page color graphs for all industries are available on request.
19Note that this is similar to what is observed in the labor market regarding individuals
seeking jobs. Individuals who have been searching jobs for extended periods of time often
have less and less chances of actually getting a job as time goes by.
20Ofcoursethename‘internetbubble’byitselfindicatesthattheworstexcessesofthestock
market bubble witnessed at the end of the 1990s were to be found in the internet industry.
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